Module 1 · Protect: close the doors takeovers use
Lesson 3 of 6 · 8 min · English · Read-only
A second sign-in step stops anyone who has only your password, and the kinds rank by whether a fake page can use them: a passkey or security key resists phishing, while text codes, app codes and push approvals can be relayed, so choose the highest kind offered and set up a way back in.
Two-step sign-in, also called two-factor or multi-factor authentication, asks for something besides your password: a code, a tap on your phone, or a key. Someone who has only your password is stopped, which is the leaked-password case from lesson 1. Any second step is better than none, and if a site offers only text messages, use them.
The kinds differ in which attack they stop. A fake sign-in page can ask for your password, then ask for your code, and pass both to the real site within seconds while you think you are signing in. That is phishing, and a code you type into a page works for whoever is behind the page. So the useful question about each kind is whether a fake page can use what you typed or tapped.
From strongest to weakest, as CISA, the US cybersecurity agency, ranks them: a passkey or security key; then an authenticator-app code, or a push approval that makes you match a number; then a plain tap-to-approve push, which can be flooded with prompts; then a text-message code, a last resort.
A security key is a small physical device that you plug in or tap. A passkey does the same job from your phone or computer.
On some services a passkey is a separate sign-in option and does not switch off the older methods. Remove the ones you can, or the old route stays open.
Turn the step on in this order: your email, your password manager, your phone-plan account, and the accounts that hold money. The phone plan comes early for the reason in lesson 2: whoever controls your number receives your text codes.
Tap Approve to make it stop
Priya’s phone buzzes with a sign-in approval for her email at an hour when she is not signing in. It comes again, and a third time. She taps Approve so the buzzing stops. Someone who already holds her password has just been let in. The prompts were not a glitch. They were that person waiting for one yes.
Deny it and treat the password as known
Priya taps Deny, or ignores the prompt. A sign-in prompt she did not start means someone has her password. She changes that password from a device she trusts and signs out all other devices. Because every account has its own password (lesson 2), no other account needs changing. If anything in her email looks altered, she moves to the first-hour steps in lesson 6.
Think it over
Which second step does your email account use today, and what would you do if you lost the phone it depends on tonight?
Priya’s email service offers passkeys, authenticator-app codes and text-message codes. She has a phone and a laptop, and she wants a second step that cannot lock her out.
The email account has the manager-generated password from lesson 2 and no second step yet. The phone number on the account is hers.
In the account’s security settings, pick the highest kind on offer: a passkey if one is listed, otherwise an authenticator app.
Why this step
The ranking above: a passkey cannot be handed to a fake page, and an app code can.
What changes
The page lists passkey, authenticator app and text message. She chooses the passkey, and her phone asks her to unlock it with her fingerprint to save it.
Save the backup codes the service shows. Print them and keep them with your important papers.
Why this step
Backup codes are one-use codes for the day your usual step is unavailable. Kept only on the phone, they would be lost with it.
What changes
The service shows a list of codes, each usable once. She prints the list.
Add a second way in that does not live on the same phone: the passkey on her laptop too, or a security key kept in a drawer.
Why this step
One phone is one point of failure. Losing it should cost her a day, not the account.
What changes
The security page now lists two ways to sign in.
Remove the older sign-in methods the account lets you remove, text-message codes first. Guard any that must stay: set a PIN or password on the phone-plan account.
Why this step
A text code is the weakest way in, and a fake page may steer you toward it. A PIN on the phone plan makes it harder for a criminal to move her number.
What changes
The service will not let her remove text-message codes, so she sets a PIN on her phone-plan account.
Sign out, then sign in again using the passkey on the laptop.
Why this step
A second way in that you have never used is untested. This proves that it works without the phone.
What changes
The laptop offers the passkey, she unlocks it with the laptop’s PIN, and she is in.
Her email now has a passkey, a second device that holds it, backup codes in a drawer, and its weakest fallback guarded by a PIN. In lesson 1’s count, a leaked password would now stop at this account, and a fake page could not use her passkey, once the older fallbacks are removed or guarded. Next she repeats the steps on her password manager, her phone-plan account and her bank.